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BANKRUPTCY-RECORDED STATUTORY LIEN FOR UNPAID CALIFORNIA
INcO ME TAXES INSUFFICIENTLY PERFECTED TO ENCOMPASS PERSONAL
PROPERTY-INVALIDITY AS AGAINST THE TRUSTEE-In re Perry, 487

F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
The question of priority in bankruptcy of a recorded California tax
lien was recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in In re Perry.' In so doing, the court added some clarification to the
ambiguous area surrounding the interrelationship between federal and
state law. Generally, in bankruptcy proceedings the trustee in bankruptcy takes the bankrupt's estate subject to existing statutory liens, as
required by section 67b of the Bankruptcy Act.' These liens must be
satisfied even before the costs of administration of the bankruptcy are
paid. However, section 67c3 qualifies this priority in several ways.
Subsection (1) (B) of section 67c 4 requires that statutory liens5 be
1. 487 F.2d 84 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974). The question considered
in In re Perry was raised in Schriber v. Alameda County-East Bay Title Ins. Co., 156
Cal. App. 2d 700, 320 P.2d 82 (1958). The court expressly left undecided the issue
of whether section 18882 of the Revenue and Taxation Code (see text accompanying
note 14 infra) creates a lien "broader than the ordinary judgment lien" by its language
making the lien attach to all property of the taxpayer within the county. Id. at 707,
320 P.2d at 86-87.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1970), which provides:
(b) The provisions of section 96 of this title to the contrary notwithstanding and
except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c) of this section, statutory liens in
favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, or any other class of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or to any State or any
subdivision thereof, created or recognized by the laws of the United States or any
State, may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the
debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against him.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1970).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970). The following liens shall be invalid against
the trustee:
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists: Provided, That where a statutory lien is not invalid at the date of bankruptcy against the trustee under subdivision (c) of section 110 of this title and is required by applicable lien law to be
perfected in order to be valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, such a lien
may nevertheless be valid under this subdivision if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of such law: And provided Jurther, That if applicable lien law requires a lien valid against the trustee under section 110(c) of this title to be perfected by the seizure of property, it shall instead
be perfected as permitted by this subdivision by filing notice thereof with the
court ....

5. "Statutory lien" is defined by Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a)
(1970):
Statutory lien shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien provided by or de-
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"perfected or enforceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that

date, whether or not such purchaser exists," 6 in order to avoid invalidity as to the trustee.

Moreover, subsection (3) of section 67c' post-

pones payment of a statutory tax lien, otherwise valid under section 67c
(1)(B), on personal property not accompanied by possession until the
costs of administration of the bankruptcy and the wages and commis-

sions have been paid.8 Should a tax lien not be valid under subsection
(1)(B) of section 67c, then subsection (2) of section 67c 9 comes into
effect and reduces the tax lien from a secured to a fourth level priority
position or to the position of a general unsecured claims. 10
pendent upon an agreement to give security, whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement or
lien is made fully effective by statute.
6. See note 4 supra.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970), which provides:
(3) Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession shall be
postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
(a) of section 104 of this title. Where such a tax lien is prior in right to liens
indefeasible in bankruptcy, the court shall order payment from the proceeds derived
from the sale of the personal property to which the tax lien attaches, less the actual
costs of that sale, of an amount not in excess of the tax lien, to the debts specified
in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title. If the amount
realized from the sale exceeds the total of such debts, after allowing for prior indefeasible liens and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the amount of the difference
between the total paid to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
(a) of section 104 of this title and the amount of the tax lien, is to be paid to
the holder of the tax lien.
8. Id. Bankruptcy Act § 64a (1) & (2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) & (2) (1970), refers
to (1) costs of administration of bankruptcy and (2) wages and commissions claimed,
respectively.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (2) (1970), which provides:
(2) The Court may, on due notice, order any of the aforesaid liens invalidated
against the trustee to be preserved for the benefit of the estate and in that event
the lien shall pass to the trustee. A Hen not preserved for the benefit of the estate
but invalidated against the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens indefeasible
in bankruptcy, so as to have the effect of promoting liens indefeasible in bankruptcy
which would otherwise be subordinate to such invalidated lien. Claims for wages,
taxes, and rent secured by liens hereby invalidated or preserved shall be respectively
allowable with priority and restricted as are debts therefor entitled to priority under
clauses (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title, even though
not otherwise granted priority.
Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a), provides the following priority:
(1) the costs and expenses of administration;
(2) wages and commissions;
(3) costs and expenses of creditors proceeding under Chapter 9, Title 18, United
States Code;
(4) taxes due the United States, any State or subdivision thereof.
10. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY 408-11 (14th ed. J. Moore ed. 1971). Generally,
a "lien" or a "secured" interest is a right a person has against property of another
to insure the payment of a debt or charge. All secured interests must be satisfied
before priority creditors share in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate. This
should be distinguished from "priority" claims. Priority refers to an unsecured and
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In Perry, the bankrupt failed to pay state personal income taxes for

1962, and the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB), in order to perfect its outstanding claim, recorded a tax certificate with the Los Angeles County Recorder in December, 1966, approximately two-andone-half months before the bankruptcy petition was filed." This recordation of the tax certificate constituted a lien under section 18882
of the California Revenue and Taxation Code' 2 :
From the time of the filing for recording the amount of the tax, interest,
and penalty13 set forth constitutes a lien upon all property of the taxpayer in the county, owned by him or afterward and before the lien expires acquired by him. The lien has the force, effect, and priority of a
judgment lien and continues for 10 years from the date of the recording unless sooner released or otherwise discharged.' 4

Since there was no real property on which the lien could be discharged,' 5 the FTB sought to establish an enforceable lien against the
bankrupt's personal property under section 67c (3).
As initially considered, the question of the priority of the state's tax
lien was summarily disposed of by the referee in his ruling that Calgeneral charge against the bankrupt's estate, but because of legislation reflecting some public policy, the claim is favored over others. The end result of this
is that the priority claim must be satisfied before the other unsecured claims. Within
the confines of the priority structure, there are different levels, a first level priority taking precedence over a second level priority and so forth. See, e.g., C. NADLER, TnE
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 150-53 (2d ed. S. Nadler & M. Nadler eds. 1965).
The distinction is often critical for the bankrupt subject to tax claims. If the tax
lien is reduced from a secured position to a priority position, the assets of the bankrupt's estate may be insufficient to satisfy the tax claim. Since a tax obligation is
not generally discharged in bankruptcy, the reduction of the tax lien can often result
in the bankrupt owing substantial tax obligations after bankruptcy.
11. Normally taxes which became due more than three years prior to the bankruptcy
are dischargeable in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 17(1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)
(1970). However, there are numerous exceptions to this rule, one of which provides
that taxes are not a debt affected by a discharge if the taxes "were assessed within one
year preceeding bankruptcy in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return
required by law." Id., subsection (b).
12. CAL. REv. & TAx CODE ANN. § 18882 (West Supp. 1974).
13. Debts owed to the State as a penalty are not allowed. Bankruptcy Act § 57(j),
11 U.S.C. 93(j) (1970); Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962). Thus the penalty portion of Section 18882, although incorporated as part of the state tax lien, is not
allowable. However, it is apparently not discharged and is still owed by the bankrupt.
See Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(1) (1970).
14. CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 18882 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
15. If the bankrupt had owned real property, the tax lien would have been secured
and preceded priority distributions. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPYrC 374-76 (14th ed.
J. Moore ed. 1971).
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ifornia Revenue and Taxation Code section 18882,16 in its use of
17
the language "judgment lien," limited the lien to real property; thus,

the FTB's claim against the personal property was denied a section
67c (3) position.1 8 The referee further noted that the California Leg-

islature, by enacting section 18882.5 in 1969 (after the filing of Perry's
petition in bankruptcy), expressly extended the lien to cover personal

property, but only upon the filing of a certificate of the state tax lien.
This negated any inference that section 18882 applied to anything
other than real property. The referee's findings were summarily affirmed by the district court. 9
Since there were no previous state court decisions interpreting section 18882, the Perry court had to determine, first, if the section applied to both real and personal property, and, second, if the lien was
valid against the trustee under section 67c(1) (B) .20 As for the first
of these determinations, the court unanimously agreed that the "all
property" language of section 1888221 included both real and personal

property. 22 This result was reached by an examination of the legis-

lative history 23 of section 18882 and by comparing it with similar code
enactments for delinquent sales and use taxes (California Revenue and
Taxation Code section 675724) and for unpaid unemployment insur-

ance contributions (California Unemployment Insurance Code section
170325). Prior to 1957, both sections 6757 and 1703 provided for

liens against "real" property only; the 1957 amendments changed that
to include "all property. ' 26 The court therefore concluded that the "all
16. See note 3 supra.
17. In California, a judgment lien attaches only to real property. CAL. CODE Civ.
PRO. § 674 (West 1967); see, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.
1948); Arnett v. Peterson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 110, 92 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1971); Balzano v.
Traeger, 93 Cal. App. 640, 270 P. 248 (1928); Finch v. Finch, 68 Cal. App. 72, 228
P. 553 (1924).
18. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
19. 487 F.2d at 87.
20. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
21. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
22. 487 F.2d at 85, 88.
23. Id. at 85-88.
24. CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 6757 (West 1970).
25. CAL. UNEmP. INS. CODE ANN. § 1703 (West 1972).

26. Ch. 863, § 2, [19651 Cal. Stat. 2464, amending ch. 57, § 14, [1935] Cal. Stat.
1262 (codified at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 6757 (West 1970)); ch. 1188, § 2,
[1957] Cal. Stat. 2479, amending ch. 566, § 2, [1945] Cal. Stat. 1103 (codified at CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE ANN. § 1703 (West 1972)).

Judge Zirpoli further argued that the in-

clusion of personal property into the interpretation of "all property" was consistent with
Revenue and Taxation Code section 103, CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 103 (West
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property" provision of section 18882 should be similarly construed to
apply to both real and personal property.2 7
The second question-the validity of the lien against personal property-presented a more difficult problem. Section 18882 provides
that "[t]he lien has the force, effect, and priority of a judgment
lien."2 8 In California, since judgment liens attach only to real property,
they are valid only as against bona fide purchasers of real, and not
personal, property. To avoid this result, the FTB attempted to show
that the legislative history indicated that the filing procedure set forth
in section 18882 would create a lien valid against a bona fide purchaser
29
of both real and personal property.
In 1969, section 18882.5 was added to the California Revenue and
Taxation Code.3 0 This section provides:
The board may also file a certificate of state tax lien with the Secretary of State . . . From the time of the filing of the certificate with the
Secretary of State, -the amount required to be paid, together with interest and penalty constitutes a lien upon all personal property in the state
owned by the person or afterwards acquired by him until the certificate
of state tax lien lapses. The lien has the force, effect and priority of a
judgment lien. 8 1
Section 1703 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code and section 6757 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, and their
more recently adopted counterparts, sections 1703.5 and 6757.5, also
contain similar provisions. 2 However, these sections also have the additional proviso that the lien imposed shall not be valid "as against a
purchaser for value without actual knowledge of the lien." The FTB
contended
[tlhat the exceptions in the sales and use tax and in the unemployment
compensation tax sections indicate -that the legislature believed that,
without them, the liens would be good against bona fide purchasers of
personal property, and that the absence of such an exception in §§
18882 and 18882.5 indicates that the liens under those sections were
1970), in which the definition of property is stated as "all matters and things, real,
personal, and mixed, capable of private ownership."
27. 487 F.2d at 86.
28. CAL. REV. &TAX. CoDn ANN. § 18882 (West Supp. 1974).
29. 487 F.2d at 86.
30. CAL. REV. & TAx. CoDE ANN. § 18882.5 (West Supp. 1974).
31. Id.

32. See notes 24 & 25 supra and accompanying text,
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meant to be, and are, good against bona fide purchasers of personal
88
property.
The majority, disagreeing with the FTB's contention, concluded that
the legislature's characterization of the lien as a "judgment lien" was
controlling. Since a judgment lien is not enforceable against a bona
fide purchaser of personal property, it was invalid against the trustee
under 67c (1) (B). Thus, the FTB's status was reduced from a postponed secured lien to a general unsecured claim (since the tax lien did
not qualify for fourth level priority under section 64a (4)4).
Judge Zirpoli, in his dissent, agreed with the FTB's contention that
the omission of the proviso exempting personal property from being
subject to the lien evidenced the legislative intent to make the section
18882 lien valid against a bona fide purchaser of personal property
upon recordation and thus was enforceable against the trustee. In
furtherance of his contention that section 18882 operated to perfect the
tax lien on personal property, Judge Zirpoli, in making reference to the
majority's contention that perfection of the lien demanded the levying
of a writ of execution (the mere recordation of the lien pursuant to
section 18882 not being sufficient), was quick to emphasize that, in
California, a judgment lien can never attach to personal property.3 5
Thus, to construe the phrase, "[t]he lien has the force, effect, and
priority of a judgment lien" as indicative of a legislative intent to impose the characteristics of a judgment lien while at the same time requiring the levying of a writ of execution in order that the lien be valid,
obliterates the well-grounded distinction between an execution lien and
a judgment lien:
Only by erroneously considering an execution lien to be the same thing
as a judgment lien is it possible to argue that Section 18882 creates a
lien that is perfected as against a bona fide purchaser of personal property by levying a writ of execution: Section 18882 creates a lien with
the same characteristics as a judgment lien and a judgment lien is always perfected under California law by filing, It is a California execution lien that is perfected by levying a writ of execution. 30
According to Judge Zirpoli's interpretation of section 18882, perfection
which is sufficient under section 67c (1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act 7
is attained by the mere recordation of the lien.
33.
34.
35.
36.

487 F.2d at 86.
Id. at 87; 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89. But see Wayland v. State, 161 Cal. App. 2d 679, 326 P.2d 954

(1958).
7. Fee note 4 supra,

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

The legislative history behind the amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act illustrates the federal policy of insuring "the supremacy of the

order of distribution provided in the Bankruptcy Act insofar as it is consistent with the continued recognition of genuine lien interests ..... ,8
While federal bankruptcy law determines the position in distribution
of the lien, the validity of the lien is determined by state law, in this

case section 18882." The Perry court, interpreting this unclear state
statute, determined that additional steps were required to perfect the
lien "against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser .... "41
Potentially, the California courts could conclude that the provisions of
section 18882 do create an enforceable lien on personal property.
Under such analysis, 67c would require the lien to be given a secured,
although postponed, position in the bankruptcy distribution, a result in
direct conflict to the Perry holding. Thus, the continuing validity of
Perry will depend upon Cailfornia's acceptance or rejection of the fed-

eral court's interpretation of the section 18882 statutory lien.
Scott A. Smith

38. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2461 (1966).
39. See notes 2-10 supra and accompanying text.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(b) (1970). On petition for rehearing, the FrB claimed
that its lien came within the second proviso of section 67c (1)(B). See note 4 supra.
The second proviso provides that if the applicable lien law requires a lien valid against
the trustee under section 70c (11 U.S.C. § 110 (c) (1970)) to be perfected by seizure,
it can be perfected after the date of bankruptcy by filing notification with the court.
See In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 193 (1st Cir. 1971). The court, in denying
rehearing, concluded that the lien was not valid against a judgment creditor at the date
of bankruptcy (487 F.2d at 89), that state law, although providing seizure as a means
of enforcing the lien, did not require seizure to perfect the lien (id., citing In re J.R.
Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 194 (1st Cir. 1971); see CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE ANN.
§§ 18906-07 (West 1970)), and that the FTB did not file the appropriate notification
with the court (487 F.2d at 89-90). The preservation after the date of bankruptcy of
a state tax lien unperfected as against a bona fide purchaser on the date of bankruptcy
remains an area of considerable confusion. See, e.g., Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy?
The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. Rnv. 681, 721-23 (1967).

